We evaluate the impact of affiliation to Fair Trade on a sample of Chilean honey producers. Evidence from standard regressions and propensity score matching shows that affiliated farmers have higher productivity (income from honey per worked hour) than the control sample. We show that the productivity effect is partially explained by the superior capacity of affiliated workers to exploit economies of scale. Additional results on the effects of affiliation on training, cooperation and advances on payments suggest that affiliation contributed both to, and independently from, the economies of scale effect.
Introduction
Fair Trade (from now on also FT) may be considered as a general purpose innovation which creates a new line of products. The main characteristic of such products is that of being a bundle of physical and "socially responsible" elements. The socially responsible content of FT goods consists of an original organisation of the product chain and, within it, of the relationship between primary producers, importers, certifiers and retailers. Such distinctive element is formally resumed by FT (IFAT) 2 rules. The latter documents how Fair Trade schemes aim to use consumption and trade in order to promote inclusion and capacity building of poor farmers in global product markets through a package of benefits which include anti-cyclical mark-ups on prices, producer friendly trade agreements (insurance against price fluctuations, advances on payments, 2 According to IFAT (the main federation gathering producers and Fair Trade organizations) such criteria are: i) Creating opportunities for economically disadvantaged producers; ii) Transparency and accountability; iii) Capacity building; iv) Promoting Fair Trade; v) Payment of a fair price; vi) Gender Equity; vii) Working conditions (healthy working environment for producers. The participation of children, if any, does not adversely affect their well-being, security, educational requirements and need for play and conforms to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the law and norms in the local context); viii) The environment; ix) Trade Relations (Fair Trade Organizations trade with concern for the social, economic and environmental well-being of marginalized small producers and do not maximise profit at their expense. They maintain long-term relationships based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect that contribute to the promotion and growth of Fair Trade. Whenever possible, producers are assisted with access to pre-harvest or pre-production advance payment).
etc.), long-term relationships, credit facilities and business angel consultancy to build producers' capacity.
In recent times Fair Trade net sales have grown considerably, leading to a mainstreaming of this market phenomenon from its original niche dimension. 3 The reason for this success is the increasing willingness to pay of "concerned"
consumers for the social and environmental characteristics of the products. 4 A main problem in the "Fair Trade economy" is that the value creating intangible, which represents its main innovation, cannot be tasted. This is because the social and environmental content of FT products is not an experience good and the asymmetric information problem between sellers and buyers may be only partially solved with reputational mechanisms and the intermediation of certifiers and labelling organisations. Tesco and Sainsbury announced their decision to sell 100% Fair Trade bananas leading the UK market share for this product to 25 percent (for a discussion on competition between fair trade dedicated retailers and supermarkets see also Kohler, 2007) . On September the 3 rd 2008 Ebay launched a dedicated platform (WorldOfGood.com) for fair trade e-commerce calculating that the U.S. market for such goods was $209 billion in 2005, and foreacasting that it will rise to $420 billion in 2010. 4 A recent inquiry on a representative sample of Italian consumers finds that around 30% of them are willing to buy FT products even if they have to pay up to 10% more with respect to non FT equivalent ones (Transfair, 2005) . The share rises to around 70% when the price is the same. Similar results are found in other inquiries in the UK (Bird and Hughes, 1997) , Belgium (De  Pelsmacker,  Driesen  and  Rayp,  2003) and Germany (www.fairtrade.net/sites/aboutflo/aboutflo). 5 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) is the umbrella organisation of 20 labelling Initatives in Europe as well as Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. By the end of 2007, there were 632 Fair Trade certified producer organizations in 58 producing countries, representing 1.5 million farmers and workers. With their families and Given the above mentioned framework, it is easy to understand the importance of methodologically sound impact studies. They can be useful to importers to evaluate, beyond the myth, whether all FT criteria are effectively applied and to understand which factors are more beneficial in terms of producers' inclusion and capacity building. They can be useful to consumers to obtain more information on the socially responsible content of the products and provide sounder grounds to their willingness to pay. The author concludes that FT benefits are of the vertical integration type and that "the decision to support fair trade requires other information about its costs and benefits". find that FT affiliates in Kenya enjoy superior product and trade channel diversification, price stability and insurance services. These effects generate social benefits in terms of reduced child mortality, health and social capital (but no significant human capital effects). observe in Peru that years of affiliation dependents, FLO estimates that 7.5 million people directly benefit from Fairtrade. For further details see http://www.fairtrade.net/labelling_initiatives.html.
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significantly increase productivity and self esteem. Consistently with the luxury axiom (Basu, 1998 and 1999) , effects on child schooling materialise only after a given threshold of PPP income is overcome. These papers show that FT may create positive or negative externalities in terms of changes of non affiliated producers' wellbeing and improved bargaining power of affiliated producers with local intermediaries.
One of the limits of FT intervention, if not aimed at improving the capacity of affiliated farmers to face market competition, is that it may create a form of dependence from the (volatile) benevolence of socially responsible consumers. 6 This is the reason why a more accurate empirical analysis (actually missing) on the impact of FT affiliation on capacity building is of foremost importance. The goal of our paper is to provide a contribution in this direction by analysing how some specific characteristics of affiliation (anticipated payments, enhanced interactions between producers and training courses) may affect productivity and transition to the optimal scale of production.
The paper is divided as follows. In the second and third section we briefly sketch the story of the cooperative of producers (Apicoop) affiliated to Fair
Trade and the dynamics of honey market, in the fourth section we present descriptive statistics for the full sample and for the subsamples of affiliated and 6 non-affiliated producers. In the fifth section we focus on the effects of affiliation on training courses, cooperation among producers and advances on payments.
In the sixth section we present and comment econometric results on productivity. In the seventh section we deal with the selection bias problem.
The final section concludes.
History of Apicoop
During the military dictatorship of the '70s was very difficult and the Church Fundesval managed six different development projects, one of which was related to honey. 8 The honey-project pursued three objectives: (i) creating an additional source of income to farmers; (ii) improving the feeding of the population through the consumption of the honey produced; (iii) favoring the 7 creation of a cooperative society (comité campesino). The first two targets were reached within five years, while the third was realized only in 1998, when the Diocese accepted the request of honey producers associated to the honeyprogram to become independent. In fact, only the honey program was making profits. The profits of the honey-program were used to cover the losses of the others: on average, in the '80s around 28000-30000 USD were diverted every year. Finally, in 1998 the honey producers took over the honey-program and founded Apicoop, while the five remaining programs were closed.
In order to take over Fundesval, honey producers had to pay the Church a sum of 180,000 USD in current terms. tests on the quality of honey and interest-free credit support.
Evolution of prices and volumes in the Chilean export market of honey
The honey market is subject to significant fluctuations in quantities and prices.
As a consequence of significant investments by farmers in Southern Chile, the production and export of honey has increased enormously over the last years.
Fluctuations in export quantities and prices are due to sudden shocks to the national production and to the international demand and supply. Argentina were allowed again, the price fell by more than 40%. The current positive price trend is due to the rising demand not only from developed nations but also from developing ones. China, the biggest honey producer in the world, has increased its per-capita consumption of honey thanks to the rising purchasing power of its citizens, thereby contributing to the positive trend. In such a complex international scenario, FT long-term contracts which stabilize the revenues can be a good insurance for farmers.
Dataset and summary statistics
Evidence presented in the following sections comes from honey producers, randomly sampled from two sets of treatment and control groups (respectively farmers affiliated and not affiliated to Apicoop) and interviewed in January and February 2008. The questionnaire consisted of a set of standard questions on socio-demographic and economic variables, plus other questions related to the honey production. 9 The majority of honey producers are men, middle aged, with primary or secondary education, married with children. Almost everybody owns the house he lives in and some land (on average 10 hectares, ranging from 0 to 160). One third of affiliated farmers have no more than 3 affiliation years, while the top third of them more than 10.
The main activity is the production of honey (60% of the sample), but also agriculture and other activities (usually employment in other firms) are important. Worked hours are around 42 per week and approximately half of them are devoted to the production of honey. Average annual total income is five million Pesos (around 6,600 Euros or about 18 dollars per day). 10 The lowest values of total income and income from honey are equal to zero for young people living with their family who are just starting the honey business. 11 During the first years of activity all the productive effort is devoted to multiply the number of bee families and honey is not produced.
The simple unweighted average share of honey sold to the FT affiliated cooperative (Apicoop) is equal to 50 percent, the retail share is 31 percent, while shares of output sold to local or international intermediaries are lower than 10 percent. The (wholesale) price of honey sold to the FT affiliated cooperative is obviously lower than the retail price, but surprisingly is also lower than the price paid by local, traditional and international intermediaries.
On the other hand, the cooperative provides a set of valuable services: free transport of honey, zero interest advance payments, lab tests on honey chemical properties, training courses, guaranted purchase of a given amount of product which reduces producers' search costs of buyers, etc.
The sample average production of honey per year is 3,200 kilos, but the dispersion is high, ranging from 0 (3 new producers with no past yield records met during the interviews) 12 to 60,000, with a standard deviation of 6,100. Although most socio-demographic characteristics are similar, there are 13 We run the Wilcoxon nonparametric rank test as a robustness check and obtain the same results in terms of significance. Evidence is omitted and available upon request.
important differences between the two subgroups, especially when looking at the production of honey and at other economic variables.
The three main differences in performance between treatment and control producers concern total yearly income from honey (2,998 against 1,252 thousand of pesos), the quantity of honey produced (4,403 against 1,991 kilos) and productivity measured as income from honey per hour worked (248 against 110 pesos). This implies that affiliated producers are both larger in size and more productive. One of the puzzles which we will try to disentangle is therefore whether FT affiliation has additional benefits in terms of productivity, net of the effect of size, and whether producers progressed in size and economies of scale, also thanks to FT affiliation.
Since inclusion in one of the two (treatment and control) samples is non random but depends on a voluntary choice of producers, we must control whether differences between treated and non treated depend on implicit or explicit selection bias. On the implicit side, producers' characteristics which affected the affiliation decision may also affect performance, irrespectively of the affiliation effect. On the explicit side, it is reasonable to expect that the cooperative selects the most promising candidates to meet the increasingly high quality standards required by international competition. In 2006 this has been made explicit in the statute of Apicoop which now establishes a set of requisites to obtain membership. The most important of them states that the applicant must have at least 3 years of proven production of honey and 25
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beehives. Note however that, exactly for this record of increasing entry standards, we should expect the performance gain to be decreasing in affiliation years (since older producers belong to vintages with less stringent quality requirements). An opposite result would, on the contrary, suggest that this kind of selection bias cannot solely explain the observed differences.
From Table 2 we can see that productivity, production and income from honey are significantly higher for Apicoop members. Our qualitative information from cooperative members tells us that the training courses provided by the association have surely played a role in increasing productivity, particularly under the aspect of reducing bees' diseases and increasing their honey production. Econometric estimates will try to verify these declarations from a quantitative point of view. On the contrary, the price and income per kilo sold are lower for people associated to Apicoop since they produce higher amounts and sell more wholesale (FT chain) rather than retail (local market).
Non affiliated producers sell only 7.5 percent of their production to Apicoop, 57 percent retail and the rest to local or international companies, while people associated to Apicoop sell 82 percent to the cooperative, 14 percent to retail and the remaining to other companies. 14 The local retail price is lower for Apicoop's members, thus there are no positive externalities of FT affiliation on their bargaining power with local buyers. 15 Another surprising element is that the average salary paid by FT entrepreneurs to the temporary workers is lower than that paid by independent ones. This is a common problem with FLO and other FT organizations, whose rules and statutes (see footnote 3) establish minimum prices and premiums for FT members but do not deal with the relationship between producers and their seasonal workers.
Training courses, advances of payments and Marshallian externalities: the difference between affliated and non affiliated producers
In this section we focus our attention on three qualifying differences between affiliated and non affiliated farmers: advances on payments, attendance of training courses and cooperation with local farmers. Looking at of non affiliated farmers. 95 percent confidence intervals show that these differences in means are significant. Descriptive evidence on these three points is confirmed by econometric analysis (see Table 3 ) where they are regressed on a series of controls. 16 The specifications include ender, schooling years, family status dummies, number of family members, parents' education, house ownership, land size, total number of hours worked, geographical and type of productive organization dummies.
Our estimates show that affiliation to FLO certificated cooperatives is significantly and negatively correlated with the probability of not having participated to training courses in the last three years (such probability falls by around 32 percent and by 27 percent for directly and indirectly affiliated producers, respectively) 17 ( Table 3 , column 1). 18 The same direct affiliation is positive and significant in regressions on the determinants of advances for payment (marginal effect of 50 percent) and declaration to cooperate with other local workers (marginal effect of 12 percent) ( Table 3 , columns 2 and 3).
Consider here that indirect affiliation has slightly higher effects in magnitude, thereby showing that these two last benefits are already attainable with it. 19 Cooperation is also positively and (weakly) significantly related to the number of hours worked (.2 percent the marginal effect), while advances on payments with schooling years. These associations are reasonable since hard working and committed producers will be more likely, and have more opportunities, to interact with other producers, while more educated producers should possess higher skills which produce superior creditworthiness.
The effect of FT affiliation has not just a once-for-all effect but also a progressive one. When in our previous specification we replace the affiliation dummy variable with two alternative measures of participation to the FT channel (the length of the relationship with the cooperative and the production share sold to the Apicoop cooperative) we find that years of relationship with
Apicoop have positive and significant effects on advances on payments and cooperation with local workers (1 and 1.7 percent are the marginal effects of one additional affiliation year on each of the two variables respectively) ( Table   3 , columns 4-6). Note as well that years of indirect affiliation (sales to Apicoop without membership) have no significant effects confirming that part of the benefits accrue only to fully affiliated producers.
Our findings are confirmed when we proxy closeness to the cooperative with the share of producers' output sold to Apicoop. The latter has negative (positive) and significant effects on the probability of having never received training courses (obtaining advances on payments) (-0.2 and 0.3 percent are, respectively, the two effects for a one percent increase in the share of the product sold to the cooperative).
The variable measuring local interactions among producers may be seen as a proxy of Marshallian externalities if we consider the well known Marshall's definition. 20 If we take into account standard criteria typically adopted in the literature in order to define industrial districts 21 we may observe that they apply much more to the treatment than to the control sample. Considering the low density and the geographical distance between producers in the rural areas in which we run our survey, cooperative membership is one of the few opportunities to bridge such distance and promote interactions among producers.
Productivity and FT affiliation
We measure productivity as income from honey production per hour worked and regress it on measures of FT affiliation and various controls ( (Marshall, 1920) . 21 The main characteristics of industrial districts are generally considered to be: i) the concurring presence of cooperative and competitive features which reduce transaction costs, ii) the high horizontal and vertical mobility of workers (Becattini, 1990) , iii) the abundance of exit and voice mechanisms generated by the intensity of productive relationships and interactions between firms and workers within the district (Brusco, 1982; Dei Ottati, 2000) , iv) the local abundance of historically accumulated intangible production factors, from (managerial culture, know how, tacit capabilities) (Maillat, 1998) , v) the presence of "social networks" (based on kinship, family and localness) which facilitate the flow of knowledge within district borders (Becattini, 1990) . The presence of these socially homogeneous communities is expected to foster the intensity of inter-firm cooperation especially under the form of joint programs for the provision of collective goods (Paniccia, 1998) and of creation of local institutions (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999) , thereby increasing social capital, which is currently recognised as one of the crucial factors of growth and conditional convergence (Knack and Keefer, 1997 22 The link between our productivity variable and affiliation is confirmed if, instead of the two dummy variables, we use a unique synthetic indicator represented by the share of production sold to Apicoop (Table 4 , column 1). A one percent higher share of sales to Apicoop is associated to a gain in farmer's honey income per hour worked of 707 pesos.
The importance of the role of the three above described factors characterizing affiliation (advances on payment, cooperation and training courses) is confirmed when we instrument the affiliation dummy first with years of affiliation ( Table 4 , column 2) and, after it, with the three factors ( Table 4, column 3). The instrumented variable is significant in the second but not in the first case. The Hansen's J statistic test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term. We may wonder whether the affiliation effect is due to the superior capacity of affiliated farmers to reap economies of scale.
We therefore make an explicit standard theoretical assumption on the inverse U-shape of the average product function, which implies a U-shaped average 22 The significance of the affiliation variable persists if we limit the estimate to producers hiring seasonal workers and therefore include in the estimate cost of seasonal labour as an additional control. Estimates are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.
cost function with increasing (decreasing) returns of scale in the downward (upward) side of the curve. As a consequence, we estimate the following specification:
Consider as well that, if γ j >0, this implies that the j-th factor (i.e. FT affiliation) produces a significant perpendicular upward shift of the location of the affected producer from the sample average product curve. Estimates in columns 5 and 6 show that the inverse U-shape assumption is not rejected (both levels and squares of total output are significant and with the expected sign). However, beyond size, years of affiliation (marginal effect of 3,039 pesos per year) and schooling years have an independent positive effect on productivity (even though they are now weakly significant). This implies that FT affiliation years remain significant once we control for the productive scale. It is also interesting to see that the affiliation effect materializes only for fully affiliated producers (or the "FT age half flo" variable, measuring affiliation years of producers selling to Apicoop at FT price conditions without being full cooperative members, is not significant).
Two issues to be discussed in our results are omitted variable bias and measurement error. As it is well known (Deaton, 1997) in development studies the first problem generally relates to the quality of land 23 and the second to measuring income. Since we are looking at honey production, quality of land is not so important, while quality of productive techniques is much more so. The latter are not exogenous since they are affected by training courses and interaction among local producers which, in turn, have been shown to be affected by FT affiliation years. With regard to the measurement error problem, the main candidate in our case is the dependent variable. This creates fewer problems with respect to a measurement error in the regressors and should not alter the sense of our estimates.
Controlling for selection bias: three approaches
An obvious problem in our model is the lack of dynamics which makes hard to distinguish between the impact of FT affiliation and a selection bias effect. Does affiliation improve productivity and economies of scale, or are more productive and larger farmers more likely to enter the cooperative? We try to provide a qualitative and two quantitative answers to this question. On a qualitative point of view consider that the competitive race in export markets is becoming progressively tighter and international standards of health and product quality regulation increasingly more severe across years. It is therefore highly implausible that Apicoop has affiliated progressively smaller and less efficient producers across years.
Just to give an example of a "vintage" factor (invariant from the first affiliation year to now) which should be correlated with productive skills at the moment of As a further robustness check we finally propose a second approach for evaluating the effect of FT, net of the selection problem (Tables 6.1 
and 6.2).
As it is well known, in the impossibility of having time series and applying more sophisticated approaches, 26 propensity score matching (PSM) 27 may be a reasonable approximation of it. By matching couples of treatment and control producers which are closest in terms of selected characteristics, we may assume with the PSM approach that the average treatment effect of the treated 25 The committee is an informal organization of a small group of individual producers who coordinate their sales and purchases of output in order to obtain higher bargaining power with local intermediaries. 26 Fair Trade existed in the area before our survey. Therefore it was impossible to perform a randomized experiment on the issue at stake in this paper.
captures the specific contribution of FT affiliation on the selected performance variable. Following what is standard in the literature when choosing regressors to build the propensity score, we ensure that the vector of variables on which the matching is conditioned is independent from individual assignement to the treatment sample.
We also check that the second crucial condition (distribution of the outcome conditioned on the set of independent variables from the treatment) is met.
Consider that our dependent variable is full affiliation and productive scale is introduced among regressors. In this way we make our test more severe since indirectly affiliated producers are in the control sample and the average treatment effect is evaluated at the same level of productive scale. 28 Obtained findings confirm the difference between affiliated and non affiliated farmers since average treatments of the treated (ATT or differences in means between treatment and control samples) are significant when looking at share of product sold to Apicoop, productivity (income from honey per hours worked), advances on payments and cooperation with local farmers (Tables 6.1 and 6 .2).
29 28 Exclusion of indirectly affiliated producers from the test and elimination of the productive scale variables (level and squares of physical production) make differences between treatment and control sample more significant. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request. 29 What the reader might question at this point is why not all producers choose affiliation given its benefits. The answer should be clear from our results. Less risk averse producers might prefer to take the risk of fluctuating honey prices to the implicit insurance provided by FT. Furthermore, affiliation to a cooperative implies the commitment to sell large part of their production to Apicoop and a series of social obligations that producers with a strong sense of independence may not like. Last but not least, producers not always have full awareness of the potential economic benefits of affiliation.
Conclusions
The recent literature on impact studies of FT affiliation is important in two respects: i) it gives to consumers of FT products a test on the validity of the promise to promote inclusion and wellbeing of marginalized producers, thereby reducing the asymmetric information gap between consumers and sellers; ii) it gives relevant insights to importers, labelers and retailers on the application of criteria, emphasizing their strengths and weaknesses and stimulating their discussion and implementation.
Our analysis on Chilean honey producers in a period of high market prices highlights that, beyond the fair price myth, non price conditions are much more On the overall, our findings show that affiliation years significantly contribute to increase producers' productivity shifting farmers above the inverse U-shaped average product curve in the sample.
Among the limits which Fair Trade has to tackle we signal the need for more transparency on full and half membership, the attention to wages of seasonal employees of producers (which is not in the criteria) and the necessity to increase awareness of local cooperative affiliates about Fair Trade. 
